welcome everyone to UCLA's Center for

Middle East development and to this very

timely and important discussion that we

are devoting today to Lebanon and jbala

my name is Steve zipperstein I teach at

UCLA and I also serve as the associate

director of the UCLA Center for Middle

East development I want to take a moment

to thank our wonderful UCLA co-sponsors

first the Unice and San nerian Center

for Israel studies UCLA and also my home

department where I am proud to teach uh

in the UCLA lusin School of public

affairs Department of Public Policy we

have an incredible panel for you today

um three experts from Lebanon I want to

on behalf of UCLA and CED thank them

given everything else going on in

Lebanon right now for these three

experts to take time to be with us is

just remarkable and we're very very

grateful to them I've asked each of our

three panelists to give 10 minutes of

opening

commentary after which about 30 minutes

from now um we will begin uh with the

Q&A so as they're talking please think

about your questions please put them in

the Q&A box at the bottom of the screen

and we'll try to get to as many of your

questions as possible our first

distinguished panelist is Dr Joseph bout

uh who is the director of The Institute

for public policy and international

Affairs at the American University of

Beirut he's an associate professor of

political studies there as well

previously Dr boot was a professor of

Middle East politics at seans Po in

Paris he was a researcher at the

Carnegie endowment uh Middle East

program in Washington DC and a

consultant for the French Ministry of

Foreign Affairs Dr bot please open your

camera unmute yourself and you have 10

minutes thank you so much for being with

us uh thank you and good evening and

good morning at in California where you

are Steve and thank you very much for

for you and CET for for putting up this

webinar and for inviting me I'm very

flattered and very honored I'll try to

stick to the 10 minutes and I would say

that given the the the situation and

where we are today very modestly I would

have more questions than than answers

and uh and I will try to list these uh

three or four four questions that I have

and they will probably try to shape what

I will say in the rest of the of the

discussion later on um the first

question to um to address our issue

tonight is um how to exactly assess the

extent of damage that hasbalah has been

suffering so far uh I'm talking here on

two levels of course the the operational

military level security level and then

the political level uh we know that the

part party has um taken huge Blows Its

lines of communication are probably

damaged the command and control chain is

also probably very much eroded however

we continue to see the party firing

missiles some of

them lethal or or hurtful towards Israel

its Fighters are still U able to hold

the ground in the south albite I mean

insufficiently from their own point of

view uh and today of course we all have

witnessed or attended or known about uh

the address of the new Secretary General

Naim kasim uh and the signs that are

saying to us that the party is more or

less under let's say recovery I wouldn't

say it has recovered but it remains to

assess and this is an intelligence

question I don't I don't think any one

of us has an exact assessment of the

capacity of the party mil Lally and

organizationally to continue to function

this is one point but the other point

remain pertaining to this question is

the political evolution of the party and

this is something that we will have to

witness in the longer term uh today I

think the party is at a crossroad either

it will and this is very hypothetical

and I don't think it's very probable

either the party will quote unquote

swallow the relative defeat that it has

taken uh chose after it ceasefire to

really change course probably accept to

come back to the Lebanese institutions

the election of a president and then to

uh gently and progressively disarm in a

way or another and this will be the task

of the next president of the Republic I

think it's the point one on on his

agenda probably with the recovery of the

country and then things will go in a

more or less uh let's say virtuous

circle with all the difficulties coming

with that I mean the the Lebanese Poli

and the way it will react to that the

the the the way we will deal with the

displacement which is a huge issue in

Lebanon etc etc however there's another

road that the party could take and it

has to do with a lot of other factors

that are Regional uh military of course

but also having to do with the Dynamics

inside Lebanon the party could also uh

choose to revert to its origin let's say

to the DNA of its origin and get back to

a sort of clandestinity a party going

underground resorting to maybe the

recipes they used to resort to in the

80s 90s and early 2000s uh before it

went into this kind of of slow

integration in the Lebanese institution

uh to become a sort of radical SL

terrorist party again and in that case I

think that the the danger for the

lebanes stability could become high and

this of course scenario has certain uh

let's say preconditions uh in order to

happen we'll talk about them uh maybe in

the webinar the second question I will

have is about Iran it's coroller to

hisbah how much will Iran accept uh so

far the the the semi defeat that it is

taking I mean the huge blow it has taken

through hasbalah and now through Hamas

of course and the end of probably the

Gaza Enclave but also directly the hit

that it has taken last week the maybe

next hits to come uh will Iran accept to

start compromising of course it has to

do with the next president of the of the

of the Republic in the US I mean the

next us Administration but also with the

choices that Iran will make internally

or on the contrary it will choose to

wage this uphill battle again and go

back go back reconstructing is its Pro

in Lebanon of course and it has to do

with hasah but also elsewhere and re

injecting the resources that it had it

has injected over the four decades now

in building this what what tan itself

calls the Strategic dep the Strategic

depth and its own network of let's say

of proxies in the region uh hasbalah in

that sense is a very particular proxy

hasbalah has been probably the most

important investment of of the Islamic

Republic for the 40 past years I don't

think that like many Lebanese are

sometimes taken to to say that Iran is

about to sell out hasah I don't think

that this is the case but it remains to

see what is now the use that Iran will

make of such an actor in the service of

which strategy uh it will put it the

third question which is I think tonight

also very important and very interesting

is the extent to which Israel is going

to uh go in this Lebanese Adventure what

is the magnitude exactly of the Israeli

project in Lebanon and in the region as

such you know uh when when the war with

Lebanon has started Benjamin netanyahu's

objective was openly to bring back the

north to their Villages today the aim

has been slightly and sometimes more

more than slightly uh uh shifted or or

transformed today we are talking about

uh either eroding or sometimes

annihilating hasah eroding the

capacities ofah obliterating hasah

Sometimes some Israeli voices have been

uh going as far as saying that they want

a landscape in Lebanon where heah is not

anymore present a political landscape

which means a political project behind

the the the military let's say

project in Lebanon the the military

let's say design in Lebanon this has to

do with what kind of political solution

can we expect will nanyu be satisfied

with a 1701 or a 1701 plus does he want

more than that that he wants like in 82

to reach a situation where you have a

peace treaty with Lebanon these are the

questions that also are opened on the

Israeli front last but not least the

question is an American question

uh so far um I mean whatever is whatever

our our assessment of Washington's

policy has been uh we can we can say

that there was a sort of permissivity

given to uh to the Israeli uh let's say

operation in Lebanon uh with some limits

but they are more operational and more

granular and tactical than they are

strategic I think that Washington is

today widely sharing the object Ives of

Netanyahu of at least eroding and

seriously weakening Hezbollah maybe of

seeing heah out of the political

landscape in the country but there is a

limit I think the limit is regional it

has to do with Iran and it mainly has to

do with the next Administration in

Washington so I think that the coming

week and the coming weeks will answer

this question and we'll have to see at

what point um the let's say the the

Dynamics of Washington and the Dynamics

of nanahu himself will converge or on

the contrary diverge these are the

questions that I have I will leave aside

some points that probably we will

discuss like the role of the Lebanese

Army the role of other components in the

country uh but these I think are the

questions that widely tonight shape my

understanding of things and the way uh

this very awful situation can unfold in

the coming

Future Okay that was fantastic Joe thank

thank you so much and I do hope we've

already had a couple of great questions

come up in the Q&A thank you to the

audience I do hope that we will be able

to address the items that you just

mentioned the Lebanese Army their role

going forward as well as what do the

Lebanese people want for their future um

so hopefully we can get to that in

further discussion let me move now to

our second very distinguished speaker uh

joining us today I'm very very pleased

to introduce uh Lori hatan who is an oil

and gas policy and geopolitics expert

she currently serves as a political

consultant with various reformist

political groups in Lebanon she has

several Publications and is a regular

commentator on issues related to oil and

gas in Lebanon and the East

Mediterranean area she hosts the energy

espresso podcast the road to cop or cop

28 webinar series produced by her

organization uh and she also in her

spare time I suppose teaches a course on

the geopolitics of oil and gas in the

East Mediterranean Lori thank you so

much for being with us today the floor

is yours for 10 minutes thank you thank

you Steve for uh for the invitation and

thank you all for attending uh let me uh

focus a bit on the internal and domestic

uh Dynamics and the impact of what has

been happening for the past year and

looking a bit uh forward on what's the

way out of what we are going through uh

so

basically as we all uh know hisbah is

facing an existential threat with this

everything that it had been built at

least since 20066 which is the last uh

uh war with Israel has been kind of been

destroyed we are seeing that its

military leadership is has been

destroyed

killed eliminated and we've seen uh that

the infrastructure it built all sorts of

INF infrastructure military or civilian

infrastructure is being hit it has been

hit and is being hit so the uh loss is

the big loss but at the same time what

we are witnessing it's like hisbah is

not acknowledging defeat on the contrary

all the discourse that is being

published stated by by the uh whoever is

left from the leadership of hisbah or

the partisans of hisbah it's all like a

discourse of uh uh Victory uh and uh

Victory being a if in on the field it is

they make success it's a victory

whatever limited success it is H now

like if they if they h fire one rocket

out of like like compared to what they

used to fire it is a victory if there if

the if there are like their military

killed or PE or their Fighters dying

this is a a victory for them because

this is martyrdom so where however you

turn it for them it's a victory and they

would not acknowledge defeat same goes

for the constituency that the partisans

and those who are supporting hisb as

well not acknowledging defeat and this

is very important to understand for the

psychic and the Dynamics internal

dynamics of Lebanon what does it mean

and for people to understand what it

means so basically because if hasb

accepts defeat that means that could be

the end of a political project that they

had which is linked to the Iranian

agenda in the region and therefore that

could mean the end of that project and

they wouldn't bear it and Iran wouldn't

be we wouldn't want to accept it because

the Iranian Pro project in the region

hasn't achieved its goals yet and

therefore it is difficult for hisbah to

accept the defeat and to accept the

defeat the second point so it's a

political issue the second Point more

important I guess for me it's like the

partisans and the constituency

especially the Shia constituency for

them the defeat means a social defeat

inside the fabric of Lebanon it means

that the Privileges that they got

because of the support they they got

from hisbah and the strong military

presence of hisbah has given privileges

inside the country for the Shia

community that had already old grievance

in the politics of Lebanon so for them

they would lose that and this is an

important important element to

understand about that social fabric of

the country and how the identity

politics has an implication so therefore

not acknowledging defeat for hasah means

that they will still be able to impose

their will and their conditions on the

internal Dynamics and especially now

where we we are like everyone is talking

about the the next day and everyone is

talking about who the next president is

if hisbah acknowledges defeat if people

in the country push hisbah to

acknowledge defeat that means that

hisbah will not be able to have a say

on who the next president is and

more to like defeating theah agenda and

the the political if you want um project

of hisb so therefore they are not they

are refusing to accept defeat and they

are seeking the support of their allies

so not to go into that acknowledging a

defeat so what happens next so a couple

of points and I'll end on

that definitely on because now everyone

is talking about the day it could be I

don't think it will be before five

November it could be by January what

does that mean first of all there is a

shortterm h concern which is about the

internal peace and Security in the

country you have displaced people that

have come from the southern areas you

have displaced peoples that are coming

from the suburbs of Beirut you have

displaced people now from the Bea all of

these people are coming into other

regions and even if people even if the

people from the other regions want to

welcome the inally displaced they are

afraid of being targeted so even if

willingly you want to accept these

people as your fellow uh uh citizens

into your houses into your regions there

is a big fear because because they are

being because the military targets are

being targeted the military hisbah

military targets and they don't know who

is who from all the people that had died

they we the Lebanese we don't know who

is who these are military or not so

there is a big fear inside the inside

the the other if you want the citizens

uh and at the same time there are some

other that are really resenting what has

happened because they feel that this is

a decision that has been taken by hasb

to take us into war and therefore why

what they they should pay the price for

it so this internal piece needs to be

really uh preserved so that we don't end

this is the short term on the longer

term definitely the work should be on

creating that country that is like for

all and where all citizens are equal and

this is a long longterm uh project two

points and I I'll stop there ceasefire

and 1701 everyone is talking about the

1701 1 andos hin was in town saying that

1701 okay but the implementation is more

important and what does that mean for

the implementation so for the ceasefire

and for the implementation that means

that you would need a president so short

term is to have a president with a

cabinet that is able to manage the

crisis and able to go to negotiations

with Israel on the on the borders to

define the borders so what Amos had

started before 7 October of 2023 this is

the short term longer term is for the

the government of Lebanon for the

political parties of Lebanon who future

relations between Lebanon and Israel

Lebanon and Syria Lebanon and Iran

because that will be very important to

understand where the future of Hezbollah

is going to be inside the Lebanese

Politics the final point the short term

again is the Reconstruction and the

reform that is needed construction again

we are taking it for granted the

Reconstruction but don't forget that the

Assumption of of Israel is that hisbah

has been building underground

fortifications in the southern regions

in southern suburbs of Beirut so the

Reconstruction will become a political

issue and it's not an economic issue so

that is something that we need to really

H think of it reforms are really needed

economic not growth even like just like

to to go back on your feet reforms are

needed and the reforms are things that

had been needed before 2023 before

October 23 the longterm of that is like

to think about the future of the country

the economic future of the country which

is like the integration within the

region if we are going

to I think we may have lost Lori there

um she had a little bit of trouble with

her Wi-Fi connection so uh hopefully she

can restore that quickly um I want to

thank Lori for her super important and

interesting remarks uh I see more

questions coming in on the Q&A thank you

to our audience keep them coming because

we'll get to those questions uh as soon

as we hear from our third panelist uh

I'm very very honored to welcome uh to

our webinar Dr Joseph gabelli who is a

physician and president of the Lebanese

information center in the United States

a nonprofit organization dedicated to a

free and Sovereign Lebanon in the best

interests of the United States of

America the organization conducts

research provides information and

Analysis and engages in advocacy efforts

the organization maintains regular

contact with Administration officials in

the US and members of the US Congress as

well as Lebanese political and Security

leaders uh in addition uh the

organization the Lebanese information

center has an established relationship

with the United Nations in New York uh

Dr gabell has authored several policy

papers on us Lebanon relations

particularly from political and security

perspectives and has been a frequent

guest on Lebanese Arab and American

Media joining us now from Beirut I'm

very honored to welcome Dr gabelli

please uh turn on your camera unmute and

the floor will be yours for 10 minutes

Dr

gabelli thank you Steve thank you I'm

very honored to be uh to be with you and

to be with this uh distinguished panels

my colleague Joe and and and Lori um I'm

I'm going to pick up on um and on some

of the points that were mentioned by by

Joe and Lori I know there's a lot to

talk about when we address this this

current War it's extremely complex but

um you know the war started in October

8th 2023 following the uh uh operation

by Hamas

um AA and this was launched the the war

from Lebanon was launched by Hezbollah

was I mean nah declared war on Israel

and the objectives of the war according

to nzala were to um uh support the Hamas

the uh uh under What's called the the

unity of military theaters so there's an

alliance between Hamas palestin Islamic

Jihad

um other Iranian um outfits in the area

and Hezbollah so um and the objective

was to divert actually the Israeli

military operation or to minimize

Israeli military operations against Gaza

and uh and divert the uh the Israeli

effort towards the uh towards the south

of Lebanon at the same time nah has

repeatedly uh said that you know there's

now um um um a new reality where there

is a balance of uh of strength of

military strength between Lebanon and

Israel when he's talking about hisbah

specifically because of the number of

missiles Rockets uh Etc and that they

will be um also resisting any Israeli

intervention in

Lebanon now of course if we look at the

results today of U of this whole

rhetoric by hisbah I mean things have

been disastrous for obviously for for

Hezbollah itself uh with the loss death

of nah himself and the majority of the

leadership there's maybe one left in the

old leadership of the of the Hezbollah

structure whether the military or the

political one and secondly um you know

some people say 70 other people say 80%

of hezbollah's capabilities missiles

capabilities Etc have been destroyed

plus we see that uh um on the civilian

side I mean the death toll on the

Lebanese side is by you know um uh at

the end of last week was about 2600

death um compared to 30 on the Israeli

side uh when we're talking about

destroyed houses about

destroyed uh house units on the Lebanese

sides compared to about a thousand on

the Israeli sides and I can go on and on

to describe the huge difference between

the damage being done to Lebanon

compared to the ones done in Israel um

and like Lori said 1.2 million displaced

like almost all the sh population

displaced in Lebanon um so and living in

in in um miserable conditions honestly

so the whole objectives that were

described by uh by hasb regarding this

operation um are really uh uh being

laughed at at this point and being

radicalized by most Lebanese even so um

that's when it comes to to the status of

of of the war itself but the question

remains which is not very clear to us is

what is the Israeli endgame and what is

Iranian endgame I mean the Israelis have

spoken different uh uh about different

objectives even as of today I mean you

have Gan says that you know we launched

this ground operation at the on October

1st and they were able to penetrate

several areas in the South which is also

a new thing um and even capture hisbah

element destroying tunnels Etc so um and

and he feels that this is could be the

end of the objectives of this operation

at this time um we hear different things

from Netanyahu that there could be a

change in the whole in the whole Middle

East uh benir also has said something uh

different regarding the objectives of of

Israel regarding Lebanon the Iranians

have send different messages I mean on

one hand it's like yeah we want to talk

we don't want to expand the war Etc but

then on the other hand they they sent

already three emissaries within three

weeks to Lebanon um the last one was was

here today saying that no the war in

Lebanon has to be linked to Gaza you

cannot have a ceasefire without a

ceasefire in Gaza and they've been

pressuring um you know NAB B who's now

the interlocutor for Hezbollah with the

International Community and others um

saying that there should be no progress

on any political uh front before there's

a

ceasefire so

and we don't know at the endend honestly

what Iran's objectives are when it comes

when it comes to leanon do they want do

they want to continue the war um at

infinum so that's that's always with

this question and the challenges now um

especially when talking about the the

the displaced is that some of them have

you know have come to areas that are not

areas controlled by hisb previously with

weapons um armed and creating some sort

of a protection to the so-called

displaced there have been clashes almost

on a daily basis the Army and the ISF

have intervened um and but there's a

threat of course of escalation when it

comes to um intercommunal uh differences

and confrontation between Sunni and Shia

between Christian and Shia between duw

and Shia especially the duw today um you

know they have several concern that they

mentioned even publicly about these

place that come to their areas uh with

weapons and with the risk I think as Joe

said with the risk of being targeted by

by Israel um now the uh uh the final

point I want to make and then of course

there's a we can leave it uh uh uh to to

questions and answers is what is the US

policy so far because I've been

following this very closely in

communication with some of the US

officials I mean the US originally when

this war started they were very clear by

saying this is the war between Israel

and Gaza between Israel and Hamas and we

don't want to expand the war and there

have been several messages sent to the

Lebanese um and of course tobah through

NAB B and others that you know don't try

and provoke Israel now there are other

emissaries also uh dignitaries from

France from UK Etc saying the same

things to uh to the Lebanese of course

the Lebanese government have no control

over uh over over Hezbollah so that's

why and and even the Prime Minister said

it publicly and openly so um the the US

has failed so far in preventing the

escalation in uh from the Lebanese side

but now amamos Hawkin is offering um a

deal that based on

1701 he's been

very cautious in in describing the

details of that deal and the last

conversation um um again we had with the

US Administration as of two days ago was

that we are waiting to hear back from

the Israelis and then we're going to go

back to NAB bir and see what the

Hezbollah SL Iranian response is um we

have some ideas of what the Israelis

would want of course they want to secure

their borders they want the return of

the displaced safely and for the long

term they want to prevent the transfer

of the continuous transfer of weapons

from Iran into Lebanon and they want to

totally um disband the the missiles and

rocket um uh launching pads and

capabilities of Hezbollah now that

sometimes is concerned for the Lebanese

because that might leave some of the

Hezbollah militia who has threatened

Lebanese before killed Lebanese attacked

Lebanese Etc imposed their Wills on

other communities um some of it might be

left intact but uh and here I want to

end with the you know the possible

outcomes of how could the this could end

one of course this could be a full

implementation of 1701 which includes by

the way um a path to disband all

militias based on the thaa core not just

an agreement on the on the border um the

other outcome could be just a temporary

truce like what happened um you know

over the last uh 20 years or so so we

could have a temporary truth and then we

can have another war in a few months or

we could have a prolongation and

expansion of the war even regionally

speaking especially depending on what

the Iranian calculus is and what Israel

objectives ultimately are we do need and

here I want to Echo what Lori says we do

need on the Lebanese side a new

government I mean the ones who are in

charge now of the Lebanese uh you know

political decision making officially

speaking the official interlocutors were

electors were elected years ago and uh

by a majority controlled by Hezbollah

and uh they don't represent today the

Lebanese people most of the polls that

have been done we've seen them done by

the Arab barometer by Lebanon statistics

even some you know polls done online and

others have shown that almost 80% of the

Lebanese do not want war which means

they do not appreciate what hasbalah has

been doing but we have to take into

consideration a unfortunate fact is that

still 70 to 80% of the Shia Community

still supports Hezbollah which could be

an obstacle to uh the path towards

disarming the militia since it's it's

empowering that community

so uh um again we're we there's a lot of

question that are left unanswered um we

have to wait for Iran Israel a new

Lebanese government so we can have a

better picture on uh what the final

outcome of this conflict will look like

thank you okay thank you so much to our

panel for your opening comments we have

a number of really great questions that

have come in uh I will uh ask four

questions from our audience and audience

please keep the questions coming but

I'll begin with four questions then I'll

come back to each of you in the same

order in which you opened uh the webinar

for about five minutes of reaction to

any or all of the questions that you

want to address and then hopefully we'll

have time for another couple of rounds

of questions uh the first question is

from Habib Malik in Lebanon at the phos

project uh he asks how do you assess the

danger of the country descending into

Civil War if hezbollah's weapons are not

degraded drastically that's the first

question second question is from

Professor morav jti at the United States

Naval Academy uh he asks the Assad

regime has been silent uh regarding the

war on Hamas and hasbalah there is

apparently friction between Bashar Al

Assad and Iran is that true and if so

has this impacted kabala's presence in

Syria fascinating question uh the third

question from Jonathan Joseph here in

Los Angeles California asking is there a

possibility for Israel to play a role in

bringing stability to Lebanon in a

political way in addition to a military

way and um joke Bailey was just

addressing that maybe the panel wants to

uh add some further thoughts and then

our fourth and final question question

for this round um from Muhammad schani

in Jordan regarding the election of she

Naim kasm does it as the new leader of

kesala does it mean that kesala has

restructured itself and can meet and

elect leaders sending a message that the

party is still strong and in control of

its Affairs without being under the

control of Iran so thank you to our

audience for those really interesting

questions uh

I will go back to Joe boat and by the

way Joe has to leave us a little bit

early at a quarter past the hour and so

uh Joe I'm gonna give you a little bit

more time uh on this round and the next

round so that we can hear from you go

ahead Joe okay thank you Steve if I

understood you well I have to pick one

questions of one or more whichever okay

fine okay okay I'll I'll pick the I the

first one I would like to answer is is

uh the question on Civil War War and the

risk and Etc and it echoes a little bit

where George Bailey and Lori has has

reached it's a question by Habib Malik

whom I salute Habib is my former

professor at AU it brings me back a long

long time ago um I I would say the

following I have three maybe three

factors that lead me to say

unfortunately and with with a lot of

sadness that yes the risk is high okay

the risk is high if we don't take uh

this very elusive possibility of the

virtuous circle that we all describe

that is predicated first on a very quick

ceasefire quick implementation of 1701

Army deployment new president enough

wisdom from the political class to

instore a dialogue with what will remain

of hasbalah because hasbalah will not

evaporate Etc ET okay now barring that

why am I a little bit more let's say

alarmed I wouldn't say pessimistic three

things one is what I call the cross

perceptions you have today uh two I'm

I'm schematic of course okay this is

grossly speaking we have two two

countries they were well described by

Lori and and and Joseph you have one one

segment of the population now putting

proportions percentages Etc I I don't I

I won't get that TR okay uh that is

living a mindset where you have a mix of

humiliation loss of prestige loss of

leadership uh uh feeling of

Revenge however defeated they are enough

powerful and fierce internally in a way

that they can control and keep their

grip on uh let's say strategic segments

of the country and you have another

population that is uh excuse if my ter

terms are are insufficient my English is

not always very rich but that is more or

less cheerful happy about what's

happening uh taking revenge in what's

happening because of course they have a

garage with with hasah and its actions

over the past decades and that are and

this is maybe the most important thing

that are maybe over reading or going too

fast in reading the defeat of hasbalah

and that could be tempted in saying okay

the Beast is now on the ground let me

let me finish it off okay this is the

first psychological Factor the second

Factor exactly what was said but I would

add some ingredients which is a concrete

very sociological Factor you have today

in a country of 4 million people 1

million point something displaced that

are with the mindset that I have

described okay that are living in very

bad conditions and the wor is to come

winter has not started uh they are

sleeping on sidewalks I mean I can tell

you they are even at a I mean within the

campus they are sleeping in the garden

in the dorms on the Cornish facing us I

mean we see them um my daily commute

from house to Au is to more today taking

me one hour and a half because I have to

navigate through this human uh ocean of

people okay so you have these people you

have have host communities like Lori

said that are more or less becoming to

be hostile okay I wouldn't say they were

hostile in the beginning but they are

and this hostility is sometimes fueled

by what Joseph has described a sort of

aggressive posture by the refugees

themselves uh with a lot of communal

tension that has been mounting up for

now years in the country and then you

have and we forget it uh in this country

of 4 million you have 1 point something

million of Syrian refugees that uh a

good part of them are uh seeking Revenge

towards hasbalah they have been

displaced from Syria because of the

actions of hasbalah in Syria and you

know they

openly cheered and danced in the street

the day Hassan Nala was killed so any

any spark between these three segments

could really feel lead to something that

is unmanageable now the un manageable is

the third point and this is I'm sorry if

I could sound maybe alarmist or a bit

maybe taken by some imagination here but

if at any point there is a regional

willingness from any party okay of

course Israel is the first one that

comes to mind but others also to invest

in this situation and say okay we cannot

finish off hasbalah militarily by a

fight at the border and Etc but we can

think asah into the Cog Meyers of a

civil strife and a civil war anyone who

wants to invest in this very explosive

situation that is objectively explosive

uh could very easily do it if uh I mean

there is a fifth colon that um

infiltrates in in this very very murky

reality so this is why I would say that

of course the role of the Lebanese Army

is very important second the factor I

mean the the rapidity the speediness

with which return will be operated

towards the South and this has to do

with ceasefire but also with

reconstruction of the villages in the

South and here I have to say that what

Israel is doing today is very very very

uh let's say lethal for the future the

fact of willingly destroying entire

Villages towards uh today in the south

in order to create a sort of not only

buffer zone but a no man's land in the

real sense of the term with no human

being able to live there is rendering

the return very difficult on top of the

cost of the Reconstruction that has been

estimated today and the war has not been

ended yet to something like 12 billion

dollar which is a huge amount for a

country that is already collapsed

financially and economically so I think

that the pressure cooker the fact that

even if this the war stops tonight Steve

at the border the pressure cooker inside

is enough heated and uh let's say at a

level that could yes lead us to think

that if not Civil War but at least civil

unrest is uh is behind the door I'm I'm

sorry to be so pessimistic very quickly

if you allow me to answer my good friend

murav zti on Syria murav I think that

you are completely right but it's more

than that the Syrian posture towards the

war in Gaza and in Lebanon is more than

enigmatic you know better than me that

there has been astounding Silence by the

Assad regime towards the war in Gaza and

now in Lebanon with some frictions and

yes some let's say moves by the Syrian

regime against hasbalah that are a

little bit puzzling I would say two or

three things first of all we know now

for a fact and I'm not disclosing any

secret that U on early October the

Syrian regime has receiv received

received very friendly and strong advice

from Moscow and from the UAE also uh

telling Assad look stay away of this

mess this is not your business you have

no dog in this fight don't get into that

and if things go well I don't know which

kind of well it is you will be rewarded

by normalization that is going on etc

etc lately this posture has become a

little bit different uh Israel has

become more ner nervous towards the

Syrian regime because it has not been

able to curtail let's say the lines of

refurbishing of hasbalah and the support

tobah and Etc because also Assad is not

controlling completely his political

let's say landscape and also because

he's playing on contradictions so there

has been if you remind if you recall uh

a series of military let's say messages

by Israel to the Syrian regime the least

the last of which was the air raid on

the villa of Mah Assad in the vicinity

of Damascus sending a clear message that

okay it's your last chance now to

distance yourself from Iran if you don't

do it you will follow the footsteps of

nasah and D I think that Assad is now

very much cored he doesn't have leeway

he knows that if he moves one inch away

from Iran he could have the the the the

fate of Ali Abdullah in Yemen being

killed uh so he is now very nervous

trying to appeal to his Russ friends for

them to talk to the emiratis to talk to

the Israelis and Etc I think it's a

hopeless game for him and yes there will

be probably movement in Syria and I

think that and this is another issue but

I'm opening another topic for another

webinar one day um Syria is becoming

again a hot spot and we will witness

probably some movement there and I think

that the margin of maneuver of the

regime is increasingly narrow towards uh

this entire issue if the war get drags

on of course I will stop there thanks

thank you so much Lori over to you for

your commentary on the

questions uh yes so a couple of uh

points I guess like to start again with

this idea of not acknowledging defeat on

the contrary like portraying uh some

sort of a victory this is where the uh

where

this announcement of Naim kasum becoming

next leader of hasb is like to say that

yes we still can function we still can

uh appoint uh political appointees or

even like when he said in he and others

said that even like in the military uh

there were like military appointees to

continue h h the fight so that's part of

that normaly at the same time I think

because it was important to have a

figure uh that would give some uh some

if you want like to put to put back Iran

to to bring to send back Iran to tahan

because Iran wants there was the vacuum

in hezbollah's leadership Iran had to

come in h and be on the front and this

wasn't like very well welcomed even our

prime minister that is usually uh very

diplomatic that doesn't like

confrontation had to come forward and

say that please stop uh your uh your

statements or stop saying that you are

ready to uh negotiate on behalf of

Lebanon or or or that or that so they re

needed to have another person that would

be the facade for for Iran and bring

sent back Iran to tahan H so that's

that's that's part of it at the same

time I I do believe that it's because

yes Hezbollah has put a lot of pressure

on the speaker of the parliament saying

that this is our big brother and he

speaks on our behalf but I'm not sure

that speaker bur would want to be

speaking 100% on their behalf at the end

of the day yes The Duality between

hisbah and and Amal movement which the

speaker of the parliament is the lead of

yes there was this Shia duality in the

identity politics that we have in

Lebanon but at this stage I believe that

speaker bur wants to play more of the

role of the person that is negotiating

on behalf of Lebanon and not on behalf

of hisbah so they needed to have Nim

kasum to come in and Naim kasum had been

the the the deputy of the Secretary

General so normally that yeah okay so

Deputy since we know that even hasham

saf who was supposed to be the natural H

leader and successor of nsta had been

killed as well so that's part of it but

one one other point that I really want

uh to stress uh here definitely I do

agree with Joe on the internal pressure

that exist and let's all hope and let's

all work that we don't end up with the

Civil War it could be that if hisbah is

squeezed in the corner with demands from

uh from the International Community

demands from

Israel Iran letting go because they're

getting other benefits so that could be

that they might be cornered to the point

that there might be internal uh uh

internal fights that could go into a

sort of civil societ civil a war so

let's hope that was not that is not

going to be the case and let's hope that

the internal forces will really play

their role in maintaining stability in

the region but in the country one thing

that I

feels a missed opportunity for the

reformist party uh and those who were

like against the structure that was

created at least if you want since 2005

which is like at the end of the

occupation of the Syrian of the Syrian

occupation there was with with with its

agenda there were the traditional

political parties with their agenda and

there was a reformist agenda uh but then

the the traditional parties most of them

uh to be fair to Jo to George bile the

politic traditional political parties

with hisbah they went into this comp

comp complicity and they created what

what what was like created State capture

with weak institutions all of that at

the same time there were like people

fighting for a better structur politics

in the country and the whole the whole

evolution of politics in the country

would have St said that after a control

of if you want of the Christians from

the creation establishment of the of the

Lebanese Republic in 1943 to 1990 and

then the dominance of the sunnis through

Rafi and the project that he had for

Lebanon and the decline of the Sunni

control after his assassination and then

the rise of the Shia in the politics of

Lebanon the evolution should have been

that after the decline of the Shia

politics in Lebanon with the defeat of

hisball would be that there would be

another political

er uh agenda another political project

that brings all the communities together

that is that state that we we call it

the rule of law where everyone is equal

regardless of their identities all of

that that should have been matured by

2019 when the uprising happened in

Lebanon but unfortunately it didn't and

today there is a political vacuum about

the day after with the decline of the

polit itical agenda ofb so what comes

next is it going to be business as usual

and the compromise that will come will

be let's continue with politics as we

know it in Lebanon and that will be

really a missed opportunity and this is

where the fear is that the International

Community especially in the Lebanon

portfolio that is let kind of by the

French that they want to lead but at the

same time there is a US influence of

course because I guess like most would

want like to deal with the more than

dealing with the French there is a sense

from the French at least that yeah let's

keep the status quo as we say the status

quo let's not shake the boat and let's

let's keep hisbah where it is ETC and

not talk much about the future of

hasbalah where it is more of a political

entity than being in political a

military wing with the political with

the political uh affiliation so that

again it's a missed opportunity

for creating something that is viable

for all the Lebanese so that we don't

end up with these Clans where every

Community is uh going and finding uh

rescue or finding relief in in their uh

if you want like like hisbah or others

and a very very important point is like

again for us internally to remind

ourself that the's defeat doesn't mean

it's a defeat of a whole Community which

is the Shia Community hb's project is a

project among many projects and the Shia

Community doesn't doesn't need to be

seen that if hisbah fails in their

project that the Shia Community has

failed that is a very important message

that all of us in Lebanon should should

keep on repeating and repeating because

that's the reality the that that that

needs to be uh sync into the uh

everyone's uh mind uh in Lebanon so that

we move on into a more secular project

maybe or more of a uniting project

rather than divisive project I will end

it there okay thank you so much for that

Lori uh Joe G over to you for about five

minutes and then we'll start our second

round

ofs yes I'll try and stick to the five

minutes um I think we have

to um agree to those realities uh

regarding the problems of Lebanon over

the last uh uh maybe quarter of a

Century 25 years after the

syrians left one is hb's weapons are the

source of the problems I mean this is

this is really what we've been suffering

from as Lebanese and even the region um

so this is the major issue other

communities I think are at the point

where they're not much interested in

arming and starting militias Etc I don't

see the Christians doing it or the Drews

or the sunnis they want to abide by the

rule of law now Lebanon is until further

north this is a multi-confessional

multic communal country um and and of

course the communities try to have their

their I guess a power sharing formula

where they can all participate in in in

making decision Mak making decision at

the level at the national level but

hasbalah has been controlling all this

by the use of force by the use of

violence you know

assassinations threats Etc uh and we can

go on and on in describing on how hasb

was able to uh to use these violent

means to control other communities

leaders Etc the the other fact that you

have to to recognize which is uh which

is someone honestly new to me is that

the the the magnitude of the animosity

towards Hezbollah in among average

Lebanese and unlike maybe what you might

hear or see in the uh in in in the news

or newspaper the political leaders today

are the ones who are trying to control

the read the political leaders are the

one telling the average hey calm down

wait a minute you know we cannot we're

not ready to start we should not be

starting award again you know let's

welcome those displaced let's not let's

not be too um aggressive against them

Etc but the average Lebanese you know is

really angry not just because of the

displace of today because he feels that

all the problems that been happening to

him over the past four or five years

since the economic collapse uh I mean

you can talk to myane and they would

tell you I'm poor today because of

Hezbollah I lost my business because of

Hezbollah my you know my restaurants my

hotel my whatever is is vacant because

of hisb so there is this this rejections

of of hezbollah's weapon which leads to

the question does this mean we're going

to have a civil war again I don't think

so I think we might end up with what Joe

mentioned civil unrest incidents here

and there I think that's that's where

the role of the Lebanese Armed Force is

essential um and the ISF and the

internal security

forces and this is a message also to you

know the supporters the donors Etc like

the US and others um to keep the

pressure on those Security Forces to

intervene as soon as possible to prevent

any escalation of of incidents among

among Lebanese citizens um but the

threat of Civil War really could only

come from Hezbollah I don't think other

communities are able to uh um to fight I

mean they don't have the the power or

the the militia structure now of course

I can tell you every Lebanese has a um

has an individual weapon at home so yes

there could be incidents like that but

to to talk about a a Civil War at the

level of you know the Civil War of the

70s and Lebanon Etc I don't think that's

that's going to happen um I'm going to

briefly address the other issues I mean

Nim kasim theim kasim I mean he he was

never a major figure INB he's not part

of the Jihad Council which directs all

the military operations he's more of a

thinker a writer an academic he used to

be um you know sort of the the the the

teacher and the uh the one in charge of

orientation programs for new recruits

and other in Hezbollah now he might have

a bigger role today the role of

Secretary General um over the military

uh structure and other political U uh

groups within with hisbah and have more

influence but honestly Steve what most

people think at this point in Lebanon is

that Iran is in control um so so Iran is

the one making making the decision U the

Assad regime Assad is trying to walk a

fine line Joe described it he's walking

fine line it's very obvious between

keeping the lines of Supply to hisbah

open uh on one hand but at the same time

looking the other way when the Israelis

are hitting Iranians the lines of

supplies and preventing weapons from

from reaching hasbalah and finally there

was a question about Israel's role how

Israel is perceives in Lebanon um Israel

is not perceived very well in Lebanon I

mean some people talk about the 1982 the

alliance with the Lebanese forces at the

time Etc that doesn't exist anymore I

mean the Christians overall including

the Lebanese forces um felt betrayed

because of the war of the mountains

where they felt the

Israelis uh let the Drews take over and

gave more support to the uh enemies of

the LF and all contacts were um were cut

back in 1986 between the LF and the uh

um and and and Israel and then of course

the Shia who were at some point

welcoming uh the Israeli Invasion

because they wanted to get rid of the

Palestinians and 60% almost of the South

Lebanese Army the Ally of Israel were

Shia but not anymore I mean the SH now

field that in um uh total U I guess

total war with the with Israel the the

Drews I don't think W jot can afford to

although we know that that Drew

community in Israel is sympathetic to

the government and they participate in

the War uh but I don't think JBL can

afford to show any um uh uh any good

relations with Israel and finally the

sunnis were never friendly with the with

the Israeli they're always more

supportive of the Palestinian cause so

um now I mean the the fact on the ground

is that yes maybe what Israel is doing

today can benefit Lebanon at some point

but it's not because the Lebanese want

it to be this way it's because that's

that's the reality on the

ground okay thank you to our panel for

incredible comments um Professor Spiegel

our director just wrote to me and said

we have to write this up we have to

publish this so I'll be in contact with

each of you separately about maybe uh

turning some of this into a publication

if you're comfortable uh we do have more

questions from our audience terrific

questions which I'll get to right now um

first is from nabila Al Mula uh who is

in Kuwait listening to us thank you for

joining us nabila nabila asks can and

will the Lebanese Army maintain Law and

Order given uh the defiant somewhat

defiant speech today that we heard uh

from the uh from n kasm uh and second

will um again from nabila will the

United States be assertive in shuring up

lebanon's territorial Integrity

supporting unifil uh and even supporting

unra in Lebanon uh the next question so

that's the first one the next one for

this round is from um my dear friend and

colleague Mora Resnik the executive

director of the UCLA on nerian Center

for Israel studies one of our

co-sponsors for this webinar today Mora

asks are there other nesa Shia leaders

uh you've talked about Barry of course

who can represent uh this sector of the

population in

Lebanon next question from Martin

klepner also at UCLA

before any progress can be made in the

Lebanon Israel relationship there is the

question of who represents and makes

decisions for Lebanon Jo G just referred

to this is it hasala Iran or the

government of Lebanon it would seem that

this question must be resolved first in

order to have a unified approach and

pres and prevent others from trying to

sabotage the process and I I will now

exercise um the prerogative that I have

as the moderator to ask my own question

we have a little election coming up here

in

America next Tuesday in case you haven't

heard um let's imagine that whoever is

elected Trump or Harris invites the

three of you to the Oval Office next

January for a 15minute meeting and the

new president asks each of you what are

the one two or three most important

policy recommendations that each of you

would make to my Administration

regarding Lebanon I would like to hear

from each of you about that not that I

would ever be president but I would love

to hear your policy recommendations you

know that UCLA CET is always very

focused on that okay Joe you need to

leave in about 10 minutes I'm going to

give the floor to you first and then

we'll go to Lori and Joe G and we'll

wrap up our webinar at the end go ahead

good thank you Steve um I I'll take the

the question about the Army the very

short answer is yes the Army can play

this role of of keeping order and and

maybe making us avoid the Civil Strife

Civil War Etc however it is under

certain conditions uh of course um first

of all I think that now and especially

tonight I'm I'm seeing the news and and

what's happening on the front of

negotiations uh it seems that everybody

is starting to agree that

1701 with some nuances and Etc is the

acceptable exit from from this okay

under these conditions we know that the

Army will have to deploy in the south in

a Consolidated manner I think we are

Troopers that should be deployed it will

need uh strong help from the outside I

think the Paris conference opened the

way for that two weeks ago uh the next

Rome conference in a few weeks will

probably consolidate that the Americans

will will help Amos hin often alluded to

to to that etc etc however I would say

three things here uh three caveats or

three dangers first of all we have lived

for a very long time in Lebanon under

the assumption that the Army and mainly

the elite units of the Army and the suon

buau I mean the the intelligence Etc is

infiltrated controlled under heavy

surveillance by hasbalah and Etc I think

that it's very unjust to say so this is

not the case the Army has shown enough

capacity to take sound

decisions uh it has shown also some uh

very let's say heroic and and and high

level battling capacity here and there

however and this is the second caveat

yes of course any project or any

political willingness to take the Army

to an open clash with hasbalah under

Hollow slogans like this Armament and

Etc is a recipe not only for civil war

but for the Army crumbling okay and this

is not a secret we I mean like Joseph

has said we know our country we know

where we come from the Army has a

history of Divisions unfortunately in

the past today it's immune from that and

I think that the disarmament of hasah

has to come from a political process

that is agreed by all the parties

including Iran I'm sorry to say so but

including Iran and this will take it

part partly answers your question about

the recommendations I would do to an

American president I think that without

an American Iranian understanding in the

region even even at in in a balance of

power where Iran is a disadvantage I

think that the region will go for a very

long uh uh let's say cycle of violence

uh the the third caveat about the Army

and this is really something I would

like to uh to stress especially that we

are talking to a mainly American

audience and I know that Jose Bailey

will concur with me the Army is today

exhausted I mean forget about the Army

as a as a fighting force as a as an

operational body the Army is also human

beings I mean these are men who are

starving who are paid today

$120 they are receiving cash $100 from

Qatar and from other countries which is

a humiliation most of officers are

working overtime in restaurants and in

private security companies to uh to put

bread in the in their to put bread on

the table for their for their kids they

are overstretched they are now asked to

do to perform police operations and and

police functions they are now securing

the airport I mean the Army is not

Superman I mean you can't ask anything

everything from this Army so for God's

sake let's start to give this Army the

tools of functioning properly and yes

politically I think especially under

this Commander in Chief think that the

Army is more than capable uh in helping

us avoiding uh the worst but it is not a

political body it doesn't have to take

political decision it has to implement

political decisions that will be taken

wisely by uh other parties thank you

st okay thank you very very much Joe I

know you have to leave us in a couple of

minutes we send our sincere thanks to

you and our best wishes for uh safety

and well-being for you and your family

thank you so much my pleasure to be with

you and my greetings to everyone on

screen and behind the screen also thank

you thank you so much uh so to Lori and

Jo G we have 20 minutes left um let's

take about eight minutes or so for each

of you to wrap up here we did have

another question that came in uh from a

a participant in Canada uh an Sor asks

there seems to be a pervasive assumption

that netanyahu's leadership will prevail

through the eventual conclusion of the

war is this assumption valid in your

analysis of the situation you're

interesting question asking you to

comment on internal Israeli politics um

Lori over to you for about seven eight

minutes and then Joe G and then I will

wrap up at the end with a couple minutes

of closing remarks go ahead Lori uh

thank you so maybe I'll start with the

Shia representation because I was the

one saying thatb and doesn't it doesn't

hb's defeat doesn't mean the Shia defeat

in in in in Lebanon so there there are

dissident voices against hisbah and even

against uh the uh the Amal movement uh

which is led by the speaker of

parliament because they feel that one

had been weakening the institutions of

Lebanon because they had the project

which is the Iranian project of creating

these proxies to fight a war on behalf

of Iran and not necessarily a war that

is in favor of Lebanon and the other had

been uh criticized because they had

weakened the institutions in a way

through corruption and state capture so

these were like the critiques from the

uh dissidence like from the Shia

dissident about like the a position of

the two political parties that represent

kind of through elections the Shia and

there were this like there were voices

very critical like lukman slim who was

very critical and tobah especially and

they had a different vision for the Shia

in Lebanon which is a vision that is

integrated into the Lebanese Fabric and

to get over the old Grievances and

saying that we were always second class

citizens and we don't want to be to

continue with that Etc and he had been

killed yes of course in a in a country

where there is no accountability for now

we don't know who killed him but all the

directions all the signs lead

tobah being like the one that has caused

his assassination there are other voices

in the country today and there were

other voices that had run for elections

for parliamentary elections they

couldn't make it true but there are

voices and there are voices that are

outside it but even

even besides that again linking what

hisb Allah is doing to this notion of

dignity of the Shia Community this is

where it this this is where it's

creating that even if you are not 100%

with hisbah and what is doing and there

were a lot of Lebanese from the Shia

Community saying that I don't agree

with's internal politics but when it

comes to Israel that I am with hisbah

because isra because they are fighting

for our own security and our own dignity

in the South so today it's very

interesting what's what's happening and

this is maybe this is what I would say

in the in that Oval Office if I'm

invited first of all like okay so you

need to understand what on the other

side they're saying and what excuses

they're giving for the situation one

Iran is saying that I am supporting

these resistant movements that want from

one side a Palestinian state from the

other side they want to secure their uh

sovereignty right okay so perfect so I

guess like the first thing is like to

give the Palestinians their state right

and the worst that will come is like

after everything that has happened that

the destruction that we end up in a

situation where it's not clear what to

do what will happen to the Palestinians

they do deserve a Palestinian State

whatever that state is so for me the

first recommendation is for whoever the

president is to really work with the

regional powers in the region and with

Israel definitely and with the

Palestinians of course to give them a

state where it is a state that will live

in peace side by side to the Israelis

and to the rest this is one the second

for hisbah it is saying that and this is

what everyone is saying they're saying

that hisbah is there forget about that

Regional agenda and the Iranian link

when it comes to Lebanon they say that

we exist because we we want to protect

Lebanon from Israel

perfect okay then so what's the status

between Lebanon and Israel we do want to

understand like what is the position

like why do we fear a an attack from the

Israelis how do we perceive Israel VAV

Lebanon these are the discussions that

we should be having to understand

exactly like what are the fears like do

we think we want to secure our borders

therefore does it end with a a deal on

the land borders and that's it and then

the Army will be the one securing the

borders and that's it perfect if that's

the consensus among the Lebanese so then

that means that I would advise the

Americans to really support the Lebanese

Army not to be what in Lebanon they call

protecting the Israeli borders it's no

it is a Lebanese Army that is really

strong to be able to protect itself in

case there is an attack right so that's

that's what that's uh that's what we

would we would do and if we think that

no this is not protecting our land and

we want to fight Israel and we want to

bring we want to we want to uh end the

occupation of and liberate uh Jerusalem

that's another fight so then then we

have to decide okay so then what's the

setup the military setup and how can we

get there so there is an internal

politics that is very important that is

not that is that I won't say to the

president of the US that is our thing

but I do believe that it is very

important every like when you hear what

is being said in Lebanon when you talk

about disarming hisbah they say that

okay but who is going to defend us

against Israel so then it goes back to

what is the status quo between Lebanon

and Israel what's the future between

these countries and how to secure that

Lebanon is out of harm from the Israelis

and especially today when you have a

very right-wing government in Israel

when you have people like smotrich like

Ben saying things and they giving

statements like Lebanon is part of

Israel or whatever or the land of Israel

goes from I don't know where to I don't

know where all of that is really helping

The Narrative of hisbah and helping The

Narrative of Iran and that's not

doing good for the Lebanese who are

saying that only the Lebanese Army is

the right AR is the one to protect so

therefore it's not continue to support

the Army the way it is being done it

needs to be really for the Lebanese to

feel that they are being supported

really to be able to defend the country

and not to police the na the the borders

for uh for um for Israel my last point

my last point it's because this is a

fear on

what's happening in the southern part of

Lebanon H and talking about 1701 because

the day after everyone is going to talk

about

1701 and basically today no one can go

back to their land in the southern parts

so what like that 1701 part of it that

was like withdraw of hisbah from the

borders already the facto is happening

because all the villages are are

destroyed but the fear for again is

about that the day after when people

would want to go back to their Villages

they cannot keep on staying is it going

to be is the southern part of Lebanon

going to be another Gaza meaning that

there will be a blockade meaning that

that Israel will want to know what are

the equipments that are going there for

reconstruction are they going to be

allowed to enter all the elements for

the Reconstruction or not are there is

there going to be a ban of who enters

who doesn't enter

all of these are things that no one is

talking about it now but these are like

the challenges that we are going to face

when it comes to the day after and the

the worst thing would be that if the

southern part of Lebanon becomes another

Gaza uh definitely with destruction it

has become another Gaza with the and

it's it is really it doesn't it doesn't

help Israel if Israel thinks that with

all of that they will get peace and

security on their on the on the on their

end it is difficult today people if even

if people were contemplating some people

were contemplating that may maybe there

will be a peaceful part Rel relations or

a peaceful future with the Israelis

today the resentment is very high and

people will not forget the destruction

that is happening today they the

Israelis are B Burning Bridges with

Societies in the H in the in in in the

in the Middle East so just to say that I

hope that the southern part of Lebanon

is not going to turn to

another Gaza so I end it there thank you

Lori so much for being part of our panel

today and for your really important

commentary uh Joe I'm going to give you

let me just check the time here I'm

gonna give you seven minutes I'm gonna

hold you to it go ahead thanks okay um

first regarding the question of the

laugh I think the laugh is capable of

maintaining security the laugh is

capable unlike what many thinks even to

confront isbah I don't think hisbah is

in a is in in in in any situation where

they could stand up to the to the

Lebanese Armed Forces they've been

avoiding it so far and um you know when

the laugh has stood up to hisbah in very

few incidents hisbah had to retreat

actually now the laugh needs a political

cover they would not do any movement

whether deploying in the South or

whether you know confronting hasbalah or

any other Mission they would not do it

unless there's a political meaning we

need a government that is willing to uh

to stand up for the sovereignty of the

State uh for rejecting the power of the

militias and for treating citizens

equally and here the role I would say at

this point of the LA which is primordial

and does not need a political cover is

to defend other Lebanese if other

Lebanese are attacked by Hezbollah um

and Hezbollah has used this before the

LA has to intervene they have this role

according to a decision by the Lebanese

government in 1990s where they put the

Lebanese armed forces in charge of

security in the countries Lebanese

citizens rely on the Lebanese Armed

Forces for their own protection they

might say the laugh that we don't have

orders to attack Israel or we don't have

orders to confront Hezbollah but they do

have the enough instructions to defend

lianes that's that's very essential um

regarding the issue of the uh of the

overall Shia situation hisbah

Etc this this this warrants maybe

another webinar but very briefly there's

three things three ways to approach this

Steve one at the communal level we have

to have Shia Alternatives definitely now

some people say because there has not

been a a a a an active participation in

the last election uh of about 40 to 50%

of Shia despite the appeal by nasala um

a very strong appeal that all voters

should be voting that this could mean

there is a significant opposition to the

to what we call the Sho which

isah um and that that might be true but

we have not seen it yet we see voices

here and there they're not coordinating

among each other but there is no Shia

true Shia alternative anyone who rules

its community in Lebanon will have a

power we'll have power in the National

decision making Hezbollah or others so

we definitely need that alternative they

have to come together they have to show

that they're willing to not maybe

starting by confronting hisbah saying

that you know we want the state to have

its own authority we want to be treated

equally among all citizens etc etc and

then progressively they could they could

start maybe challeng over the sh

Community secondly we need as I said

earlier we need at the national level we

need a a Lebanese political cast that's

not subservient to

not a mafia militia government a a a

government that is truly sovereigntist

and um U uh and clean basically because

that's howb has been controlling so far

I mean the Shia Community is 30% of the

population hasbalah controls 80% of them

so hasbalah truly is only 20% of the of

the whole Lebanese so if you ask well

how come they're controlling Lebanon

it's because creating all these network

of of alliances with other political

groups and and um uh uh you know

offering services and and other I guess

illegal activities to certain

politicians so we need this at the

national level finally and this is

something that also has to do with your

question about what would you ask the uh

uh the next US president is Iran if you

don't address the issue of Iran in

Lebanon which has not been

addressed by by the way none of the

three things that are mentioning has

been addressed at all so that's why has

is still strong but if we don't address

the issue of Iran interference which is

an international obligation there are

Security Council resolutions that

prevent Iran from sending weapons abroad

but Iran has not been held accountable

for their actions and so far this has

not been mentioned we talked a lot about

the nuclear deal and the nuclear threat

nothing about the militias nothing about

sending weapons illegally to Lebanon and

provoking this provoking this this

unrest within Lebanon and as far as the

Israeli Lebanese uh uh conflict you know

let's remember Lebanon sign in Armistice

with Israel in 49 after the war of 48

between 49 and 68 there were ex almost

almost no incident between Israel and

Lebanon there were maybe like 20

incidents alog together that were

immediately solved why the the situation

deteriorated after 68 because the PLO

moved in into the south of Lebanon and

Lebanon lost control over the South and

then it was the syrians and now the

Iranians so we do not have major

contentious issues with Israel the

issues of the land border issues are are

minimal and can be resolved by the way

they started to be resolved within the

unifil uh tripartite activities and you

know and here I want to mention

something about unifil because the

question came up honestly unifil has

been I hate to say it has been useless

over the past I mean there's 500 plus

million dollarss spent on them every

year but if you asked me you know how

effective were they in in in preventing

any War any conflict any presence of uh

armed elements in the South Etc not much

I mean the only role they play and we

have to recognize that is to have to go

to to be the sort of mediator between

Israel and and Lebanon when there are

incidents and doing these tripartite

soldiers to do that

um so the the last thing I want to

mention mentioned about and and and uh

uh Lori alluded to that what I would add

to the next US president and about us

policy is focus on a two-state solution

focus on SOL solving the Palestinian

problem because that would diffuse a lot

of tension in the Middle East and that

would remove the whole Iranian factors

in the region and within

Lebanon coordinate work with what I

would call the true allies of the US the

people that are clean that are sovereign

to

that are not beholden to Hezbollah you

these people exist and now they are the

majority or at least they represent the

majority of the Lebanese people so

instead of dealing with the status quo

which is again the mafia militia cast

ruling the country you have people in

the opposition you have people in in in

Parliament you can deal with they're

dealing with them but you can do more

with them just to have more stability in

Lebanon and honestly to have true

within within the Lebanese political

cast thank you thank you so much Joe um

please all of you um I'm sure that you

share our gratitude here at UCLA CED to

our panelists our wonderful panel for

their expert analysis for their courage

to be with us today on this webinar live

uh and for their willingness to answer

quite frankly all of the questions from

all of you we're very very grateful um

to both Joe's and to Lori for joining us

today um I also want to express once

again my gratitude to our wonderful UCLA

co-sponsors the narian center for Israel

studies and the department of public

policy in the lusin school of public

affairs I want to thank our incredible

CED staff salame mohajer Emily pistol

and Laura Lee who were so hard to put

this webinar together to make it run so

smoothly uh please join us and you can

see it up on the screen now uh for our

next and final webinar of the current

academic period November the 12th um

where we will focus on the outcome

hopefully we'll know the outcome of the

election by November the 12th if not we

may need to reschedule this but we want

to talk about on November the 12th uh

the new US president and the impact of

the new incoming Administration the

Middle East North Africa region we'll

have a couple of very very high level

experts uh from Washington DC and New

York to talk about that you can see

there that uh the uh QR code is

available if you want to register for

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um peace prosperity for you and your

families thank you for joining us and we

will see you again in the very near